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Peacebuilding in Liberia and the 
Case for a Perspective from Below

Perhaps the greatest conceptual and operational weakness of existing 
reform efforts is that they tend to be informed by donors’ own institu-
tional and administrative experiences, rather than by the political, eco-
nomic, and social realities of recipient countries. (…) International 
support for customary or non statutory security and justice systems 
may be a step toward rectifying a weak state legitimacy by explicitly 
enabling citizens to choose their own forms of security (Annual Review 
of Global Peace Operations 2010, p 19) 
Introduction 
Since the end of the conflict in Liberia, a main priority of the UN Mis-
sion (UNMIL), UN agencies, NGOs and INGOs has been to deal with 
the very high levels of sexual violence against women and children. 
Central to these efforts have been a series of Rule of Law reform ini-
tiatives, notably the establishment of Women and Children’s Protec-
tion Sections (WACPS) as physical units adjacent to over 30 police 
stations throughout the country, staffed by teams of police officers and 
dedicated to addressing sexual and gender-based violence – SGBV. 
 
This focus has led to various initiatives from the international com-
munity, including a joint UN and Government of Liberia national 
strategy on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 
1325 (see Government of Liberia 2009), the creation of a Ministry of 
Gender and Development, and several campaigns aimed at engender-
ing awareness. Despite these initiatives, the problem continues. Few 
perpetrators are brought to justice; even fewer face trial and are found 
guilty. 
 
In the present paper we investigate the tension which lies between ad-
dressing specific issues per se, and viewing them within their broader 
context. Much of the problem may lie in the fact that SGBV is not 
dealt with in the broader context of (re)building rule-of-law institu-
tions as a whole, or by taking into account how local traditions and 
systems of justice administration work in practice. There is, we argue, 
in supply-driven humanitarian and development aid an inherent dan-
ger that results in the funding of short-term projects that resonate with 
donors, at the expense of long-term infrastructure projects. This is also 
apparent in efforts to deal with rule-of-law institutions. Operating on a 
tabula rasa basis seems to be the preferred option of international re-
formers in the wake of armed conflicts. Too often, the assumption is 
that since ‘it’s a jungle out there’, things must operate according to the 
laws of the jungle. These inherently work against the ideals and prin-
ciples which international institutions ipso facto embody – especially 
in the case of SGBV. 
 
Based on a brief account of the implementation of policies aimed at 
dealing with SGBV in Liberia, we argue that these suffer from various 
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shortcomings symptomatic of the generic and supply-driven way in 
which the UN and international donors tend to address 
(re)construction challenges in post-conflict areas. We see a fundamen-
tal disconnect between the international level where policies are de-
vised, and the local level where these are implemented. This discon-
nect is due largely to the fact that policy-makers at the international 
level lack the knowledge and analytical means necessary to grasp the 
root causes of the problems, as well as because of structural factors 
(including the dearth of infrastructure) which limit the effectiveness of 
measures implemented. International donors and the UN often assume 
that nothing is working and that everything in a post-conflict envi-
ronment will have to be built anew. Measures implemented are often 
ineffective or counterproductive, and international actors are largely 
left to deal with the symptoms.  
 
Remedying these difficulties will require taking stock of how institu-
tions worked before the intervention, and tackling the problems in a 
comprehensive manner, rather than in the piecemeal fashion that suits 
the agendas of largely Western donors. For, as we argue, the problem 
in Liberia is not impunity for SGBV crimes, but for crimes in gen-
eral.1 In the final section of this paper we examine such questions 
through material and analysis from a recent report on rule-of-law re-
form in Liberia by the US Institute of Peace (Isser et al. 2009). From 
the experiences of Liberians with both traditional arrangements and 
customary ones, we argue that, perhaps paradoxically, the rights of 
women may in some cases be better advanced by allowing the tradi-
tional chiefs to administer justice. 
Background  
Scholarly research on UN peacekeeping operations has a rather short 
history, dominated by theory from the discipline of international rela-
tions. The focus has largely been on operational issues, rather than 
analysis of the broader picture of international politics and global gov-
ernance.2 However, there are exceptions (see Center on International 
Cooperation, 2005, for an overview); and in the past decade, research-
ers like Roland Paris and Michael Pugh have questioned the practices 
of peacekeeping in relation to the prevailing global norms and the 
global order that peacekeeping serves.3 Whereas these scholars argue 
that peacekeeping tends to be flavoured by dominant ideologies, we 
focus on how this happens, by questioning the rationality behind 
                                                 
1  The paper builds on fieldwork undertaken in Liberia in December 2007, May 2008, and 
January/February 2009 and is based on the general implementation of UNSC resolutions 
on women, peace and security (1325, 1820, 1888 and 1889), visits to WACPS, and inter-
views with NGO workers, UN officials and Liberian government officials. 
2  Bellamy (2004). 
3  See: Paris (2000, 2003) and Pugh (2004) 
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peace efforts. The à la carte methods of Western donor countries 
negatively affect their ability to listen, consult and in general demon-
strate greater understanding for a society in a post-conflict situation. 
This was also highlighted by UN SRSG Kai Eide in his final press 
conference in Afghanistan, where he urged the international commu-
nity to ‘… understand the pulse of (…) (the) society better than we do 
today.’(Eide 2010) 
 
Rule of law reforms in Liberia over the past five years serve as a clear 
example of how the international community has failed on this point, 
as the country’s own practices have been generally neglected in the 
process. Characteristically, there is little updated information on the 
customary law and traditional practices of Liberia. In investigating 
how the international community addresses SGBV in Liberia, we 
found within the liberal peacekeeping/building paradigm few analyti-
cal tools that could be used to gain a solid understanding of the host 
country ‘from below’. This area of society remains a professional 
blind-spot and represents a gap in the efforts of the international 
peacekeeping/-building community to build a sustainable peace in the 
country.4 The best attempt at mapping Liberia’s customary justice sys-
tem is probably that made by Isser and her research team from USIP 
(2009). They provide thorough documentation of this traditional sys-
tem, how it has survived years of civil war and remains active and 
functional in all communities throughout the country, at all levels.  
Liberia’s Customary Justice System 
The local level has an impact on the national level, and vice versa. In 
Liberia this is especially relevant as the country has a dual justice sys-
tem: a formal court hierarchy under the judiciary, and a system of cus-
tomary courts authorized under the Hinterland Regulations. This sys-
tem was established as an attempt on the part of the Liberian state and 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs to extend its authority by using indi-
rect rule. The landscape of the justice system in Liberia is a complex 
one, involving several different and parallel systems.   
 
The levels of the customary justice system range from senior members 
of a household to the county superintendent. Below is a brief overview 
of the hierarchy, in descending order (see also Isser et al. 2009: 23): 
 
 county superintendent 
 district commissioner 
 paramount chiefs 
 clan chiefs 
                                                 
4  Seabrook (forthcoming). 
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 town chiefs  
 quarter chiefs 
 senior member of a household / family 
 
This customary justice system involves ‘non-binding arbitration with 
additional elements of mediation’ (Isser et al. 2009: 26), whereby 
cases can be appealed to higher levels and to the formal system. If, for 
example, one of the parties disagrees with the decision of a town 
chief, the case can be taken further to the next level, which might be 
the paramount chief or the formal system. However, the customary 
justice system is not permitted, by state law, to handle matters of seri-
ous crime. In order to find the truth and assign guilt in a case, the 
chiefs consult civil society – communities of elders, youth groups or 
families in the local community. The chiefs are also accompanied by 
elders when they examine witnesses. Isser and her research team de-
scribe how the customary justice system is anchored in the social 
community by this consultative process, and how the system is capa-
ble of ‘addressing deeper social factors that inform dispute’. The 
process is said to be transparent and public. The decisions are part of a 
system that relies on the substantial role played by kinship and the 
elders in Liberian society. Redress is first and foremost aimed at social 
reconciliation. The most efficient means of ensuring that unwanted 
behaviour is put to an end is not punishment, but the social shame 
placed upon the guilty part. As of today, this customary system is pre-
ferred by Liberians in general; it is seen as being more accessible and 
efficient than the formal system (Legal Working Group 2009: 3). 
 
Another category in the customary system is the secret societies. 
Prominent secret societies in Liberia are the Sande, the Poro and the 
United Brothers of Friendship (UBF). The first two societies exist 
throughout Liberia and are inclusive in their recruitment strategy, the 
last one, UBF, is perceived as being part of, and as maintaining the 
position of, the elite culture in Monrovia. Unlike Liberia’s customary 
system, these secret societies are not recognized by law or the state, 
but gain their authority from local communities. Whereas the custom-
ary system seems to have been limited in recent years, Isser and her 
research team found trends to indicate that secret societies in Liberia 
are prominent and play an increasingly influential role on the justice 
system.   
 
Still, most of the disputes solved in Liberia are solved through re-
course to the customary system. The Legal Working Group has ex-
pressed concerns about the constraining of the customary systems 
(2009: 7). Furthermore, the Group fears that undermining the custom-
ary system and the traditional leaders by limiting their authority might 
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result in a justice vacuum that could destabilize communities and re-
gions.  
 
Both the reports mentioned above also note concerns about the cus-
tomary system as regards human rights, gender equality and separa-
tion of power. That, however, does not mean that the international 
community should not have strategies for building on these traditional 
structures as long as the same concerns can be directed towards the 
formal justice system) . The case study presented below shows the ef-
fects of this gap in justice-reform efforts, and indicates that mapping 
and integrating customary structures in the reform can provide a more 
comprehensive approach to building a sustainable peace in Liberia.    
Too Little & No Plan? 
The efforts of the international community to address SGBV in Libe-
ria have been numerous (see Schia and de Carvalho 2009 for an over-
view), and include building special Women and Children’s Protection 
Sections (WACPS) adjacent to every county headquarters of the Libe-
rian National Police (LNP). However, despite various action plans – 
both international and national – anti-SGBV efforts still lack coher-
ence and have not yielded the results initially hoped for. The UN has 
recognized this: ‘sexual violence against women and children remains 
a central reality of life in Liberia’ (UNMIL 2008). Over fifty cases of 
rape are reported every month, and few of these are sent to court. An 
unknown number of cases are never reported to the police. 
 
The reasons for this are many. Reporting a case of SGBV to the police 
can lead to stigmatization of the victim from the community. Also, as 
the WACPS are based mainly in county capitals, reporting a crime can 
take the victim days of travelling. As an NGO worker told us, ‘It’s 
difficult to report to the police as there is no way of contacting them in 
the countryside.’ Furthermore, the police often lack even basic logisti-
cal support. Some counties count only a single police car, and even 
fewer have the means to pay for fuel. The police often need to be 
pressured in order to investigate – and victims reporting a crime are 
routinely asked to contribute financially towards its solution. 
 
Those who do contact the police are often left in the difficult position 
of having reported a crime and identified the perpetrator (who more 
often than not is known to the victim), without the police having the 
means to investigate or otherwise follow up. Furthermore, there is no 
proper backup for police investigation, and few officers have received 
the necessary training. Most convictions happen either through con-
cession or witness corroboration. Although international donors have 
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sought to remedy this, much of what has been provided is incompati-
ble with Liberian police methods.  
 
Finally, even if a case is investigated, proper prosecution routines are 
generally lacking. Outside of Monrovia, there are few qualified 
judges, and few places which have all the elements of rule of law. As 
the situation is now, large numbers of people are jailed without ever 
having been prosecuted.5 In consequence, SGBV is still largely dealt 
with by the traditional customary system and solved through payment 
of a monetary settlement. Faced with these challenges, the UN and 
international donors have set up various programmes, with SGBV one 
of the priorities to be dealt with. 
SGBV and the Rule of Law: A Fragmented Approach 
However, these programmes are often disconnected or not based on 
actual local needs. As a UN official said to us, ‘The UN tends to 
fragment vulnerable issues. SGBV has become fragmented and rape 
has taken all the attention.’ An NGO worker explained: ‘GBV tends to 
be equated with rape, at the expense of other forms of gendered vio-
lence.’ Other issues which the UN generally condemns, such as Fe-
male Genital Mutilation (FGM), a practice which 10 UN agencies 
united in condemning on 27 February 2008, have also been absent 
from the UN agenda in Liberia, despite widespread practice. As was 
confirmed to us by a UN official, ‘The UN work on “harmful tradi-
tional practices” has been in the pipelines for years, but the govern-
ment are not keen on dealing with the issue.’ FGM as a form of gen-
dered violence has thus been entirely absent from the UN’s agenda, 
despite international condemnation of the practice. It has been put in 
the shadow of rape, and been disconnected from SGBV: ‘Rape is eas-
ier to tackle than FGM: the government blames the conflict, and most 
cases are in rural areas’, a UN official explained.  
 
This fragmentation of SGBV also occurs at the strategy level, where 
SGBV policies are implemented without taking into account the 
broader processes of (re)building rule-of-law institutions. As one in-
terviewee put it, ‘there is no question that rapes are bad, but the re-
sponse is devised wrongly.’ In many cases, a deeper understanding of 
the root causes of SGBV is entirely lacking in UN policies. For in-
stance, when asked what understanding of the causes of rape informed 
the response to SGBV devised by the UN, none of the UN officials we 
interviewed were able to answer. As to the causes of rape, an official 
in UNMIL’s Gender Section told us (in January 2009): ‘We are doing 
our research.’ UNMIL’s first report on the causes of rape was reported 
                                                 
5  UNMIL’s Correction Advisory Unit reported in 2008 that the prison facilities are mas-
sively overcrowded, with over 90 per cent of the prison population in pre-trial detention. 
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to be in preparation. But whether this report will have an effect on the 
policies pursued by UNMIL remains to be seen. As one UN official 
explained to us: ‘The problem we have with these [strategies] is that 
we have hundreds and hundreds of strategies. It’s just madness! It’s 
why nothing ever gets done.’ 
 
It also seems that efforts to deal with SGBV have come to the fore, at 
the expense of other processes such as judicial reform, training new 
legal specialists, and fighting corruption. As one interviewee told us, 
‘[GBV work] is diverting the attention from the serious problem, cor-
ruption. It detracts the attention from corruption. The government to-
day is massively corrupt.’ According to this legal specialist, the prob-
lem was that too much emphasis was put on addressing solely SGBV, 
and that other more problematic issues were left unaddressed: ‘Every-
one looks at GBV at the expense of a holistic picture of the criminal 
justice system. The problem is the legal system as a whole.’ A view 
we encountered frequently was that the problem in Liberia in terms of 
impunity for SGBV crimes was not so much that the system was bi-
ased against women, but that ‘GBV programmes do not address the 
root causes of why people can’t get justice.’ Work on tackling SGBV 
today focuses largely on the symptoms, without addressing the cause. 
As one interviewee exclaimed: ‘Why can’t victims of rape get justice? 
It’s not because they’re women; not because they’re victims of rape; 
it’s because nobody gets justice here!’ While the UN and international 
donors seek to deal with SGBV through various programmes, these 
are seldom coordinated, take little stock of the institutions already 
working, and lack an understanding of the cause of the problems at 
hand. 
Liberia: Terra Nullius? 
Thus, the UN has little understanding of the traditional customary sys-
tem. Indeed, most UN people we interviewed had only a marginal un-
derstanding of the Liberian penal code. As a case in point, UN per-
sonnel and NGO workers we spoke with generally saw it as a great 
success that rape had been introduced in the penal code as a crime in 
2005 as the result of pressure from the international community. 
Symptomatic of this lack of knowledge of the judicial system is IRIN 
News (the Integrated Regional Information Networks, part of the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) which states, in 
the country profile of Liberia, ‘Liberian law prohibits domestic vio-
lence; however, violence against women has become widespread. 
Several NGOs have programmes to help abused women and girls, and 
to increase awareness of their rights. […] In December 2005, parlia-
ment passed legislation to make rape illegal.’ (IRIN 2007) This is in-
correct. The new rape law did not formalize recognition of rape as a 
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crime – rape was already on the statutes. What it did was to modify 
and add to existing legislation, for instance making new provision for 
rape within marriage, and against sexual intercourse with minors be-
tween the age of sixteen and eighteen. The views we heard from most 
representatives of the international community during three fieldwork 
sessions in Liberia clearly indicate the extent to which the UN system 
is inadequately informed to deal with SGBV and the rule of law in a 
comprehensive manner. 
 
The terra nullius fallacy is also evident in the logistical support pro-
vided to the national police. Equipment provided for the WACPS in-
cluded PCs and electric generators. However, computer literacy is of-
ten limited, and generators require scarce fuel, which is needed for 
driving. The dire lack of resources to actually go and investigate 
crimes is a much more pressing concern than providing top-of-the-line 
computer equipment. Indeed, it was unclear to us why these com-
puters had been provided in the first place, as the working methods of 
the police did not require them. The logistical support provided for the 
WACPS was dispatched without having first considered the working 
methods of the local police, their needs, and without having made any 
attempt to budget for running costs. 
 
On the other hand, having two systems working alongside each other 
also represents challenges: ‘The problem with customary law is that 
no one has ever mapped the customs in Liberia. This represents a 
problem in terms of getting them [the two systems of law] to work 
together’, Anthony Valcke of the American Bar Association told us. 
‘Customary law needs to be mapped.’ What we witness in Liberia is 
to a large extent what Sarah Cliffe and Nick Manning have termed 
‘the fallacy of terra nullius’ – the inability of the UN to take into ac-
count pre-existing institutions and the assumption that everything 
must ‘start from zero’ (Cliffe and Manning 2008: 165) 
Avoiding the Terra Nullius Fallacy 
Taking stock of how the system works before an intervention is a pre-
requisite for understanding how to intervene efficiently and produc-
tively. As Erik Jensen has emphasized in the case of rule-of-law insti-
tutions, the interplay between statutory and traditional customary sys-
tems may in many cases be more efficient and enjoy greater legiti-
macy than a ‘modern’ statutory system imposed from outside. The 
problem, according to Jensen, is that expectations as to programmes 
installing ‘formal laws and legal institutions’ are too high: 
 
These expectations are driven by a set of assumptions about 
the number of outcomes that can be achieved through rule of 
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law assistance and when they can be achieved. The number is 
unrealistically high and the timing unrealistically short. We 
expect too much, too soon, with too little money, too much 
emphasis on technical precision, and too little on the embed-
ded political, economic, and cultural dynamics that surround 
institutional change (Jensen 2008: 129).6 
 
Simply imposing a new set of formal laws and institutions without 
understanding how the customary traditional system works, as has 
largely been the case in Liberia, may not work: ‘One needs to under-
stand what is being handled well through informal mechanisms based 
on custom and convention and what strategic issues are not being 
handled well through those mechanisms or not handled at all.’ (Jensen 
2008: 122) With reference to the UN mission to East Timor, Jensen 
comments, ‘UNTAET was slow to realize the role and value of tradi-
tional justice, perhaps because some presumed that the traditional sys-
tem of justice lacks mechanisms to meet international standards of 
human rights, especially gender equality’ (2008: 132).  
 
From our fieldwork in Liberia and the interviews conducted there, it 
can seem as if the UN is once again trapped, seeing what it expects to 
see rather than what is on the ground. The response devised in such 
cases is generally recourse to standard responses – which in the case 
of the UN and Western NGOs means a propensity to build institutions 
and institutional responses based on the Western liberal model (see 
Sending 2009), combined with the imperative of results-based man-
agement. In connection with the institutions of rule of law, this often 
leads to a strong belief in formal and centralized institutions, and 
measures where the output is clear and measurable. In the case of the 
WACPS, such measures can lead to a fragmentation of thorny issues 
which should be seen as interrelated. Institutional responses to SGBV 
cannot be effective unless the rule-of-law institutions as a whole func-
tion properly. As UN DSRSG for the Rule of Law Henrietta Mensa-
Bonsu stressed in an inaugural speech on 7 June 2009, ‘the justice sys-
tem will only be as good as individuals, make it.’ (UNMIL 2009)7 
However, too little has been done to train new people to take on these 
important tasks, and the rule-of-law institutions lie fallow.  
Odd Bedfellows? SGBV & Traditional Justice 
If we for the moment agree that using the interplay between statutory 
and traditional customary systems may in many ways be more effi-
cient and legitimate than addressing the rule of law institutions 
                                                 
6  This seems the case in much of the literature on rule-of-law reforms in peace operations. 
See for instance Till Blume (2008) in which he reviews Call (2007), Carrothers (2006), 
Jones et al. (2005) and Stromseth et al. (2006). 
7  What was inaugurated on the day of that speech was in fact a newly-constructed building. 
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through imposing of a Western liberal statutory system, several prob-
lems arise. First and foremost, the challenge is for the international 
community to understand how these traditional systems work. While 
there has been a tendency to ignore traditional conflict management 
mechanisms, there is also an almost total lack of understanding of how 
traditional arrangements work. If these arrangements are to work in 
conjunction with a statutory court system, a precondition is knowledge 
about how traditional arrangements work, and which areas they cover 
in a manner generally acceptable by international standards. In the 
case of Liberia – as mentioned above – little such knowledge about 
the traditional system has been available. Here the recent impressive 
study by the US Institute of Peace (Isser et al. 2009) breaks some new 
ground in showing not only how traditional systems work, but also 
what expectations Liberians have to conflict management systems, be 
they traditional or ‘modern’. That study makes it possible for us to 
tentatively sketch out how such an interplay between different mecha-
nisms and institutions for conflict management might work in address-
ing SGBV. 
 
As Isser and her colleagues note, ‘While there is widespread under-
standing that rape cases must go to the formal courts, there is also 
widespread dissatisfaction with how formal courts handle the cases – 
primarily for the same reasons that formal courts are seen as ineffec-
tive generally – and concern that the ineffectiveness of the courts 
leads to impunity.’ However, while there seems to be agreement that 
rape is a type of crime that should fall under the jurisdiction of the 
formal court system, Liberians also criticize the new rape law ‘for not 
allowing for restorative remedies that take into account broader social 
interests for “less egregious” types of rape.’(Isser et al. 2009: 6) As a 
male respondent from Nimba County is reported to have said, the tra-
ditional system has an element of reconciliation which the formal 
court system lacks: ‘The traditional way is good because whenever 
you go wrong, and they fine you. Even if you wrong XYZ, they will 
tell you the fact, even though it may hurt. But the fact will be told and 
later they will bring the both of you together as brother and sister’ 
(ibid.) In the words of another respondent, ‘Actually, the customary 
law is the one that I prefer [...] Our traditional laws help us to handle 
our dispute very easily and after the settlement of these disputes, the 
disputants go with smiles in their faces [...] [In] fact, the statutory law 
brings separation among our people’ (ibid.: 4). There would appear to 
be a clear case for attempting to draw upon both systems in adminis-
tering justice, for the traditional system does seem to take into account 
several elements which the formal court system does not. Liberians 
are dissatisfied with the formal system, and not only because it does 
not deliver effectively: 
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Most Liberians would still be unsatisfied with the justice 
meted out by the formal system, even if it were able to deliver 
on the basics [...] This is because the core principles of justice 
that underlie Liberia’s formal system, which is based on indi-
vidual rights, adversarialism, and punitive sanctions, differ 
considerably from those valued by most Liberians. One of the 
consistent complaints levied by Liberians against the formal 
court system is that it is overly narrow in how it defines the 
problems it resolves and thus fails to get at the root issues that 
underlie the dispute [...] In order to be seen as adequate, justice 
must work to repair those relations, which are the ultimate and 
more fundamental causal determinant, rather than merely treat 
the behavioral expressions that are viewed as its symptoms. 
(Isser et al.: 6–7) 
 
From a Liberian perspective, formal resolution of a case in court does 
not resolve the issue, but ‘serves to exacerbate adversarial relations’ 
(ibid.). 
 
Indeed, the formal court system does have problems of effectiveness. 
This is also confirmed by Isser and her colleagues: ‘The fact that even 
Supreme Court decisions may be openly flouted speaks to the formal 
system’s broader lack of local credibility in the areas of enforcement 
and effective resolution’ (ibid.: 46). This contrasts with the customary 
system, of which most Liberians report that ‘resolutions reached 
through customary processes are final and carried out. (...) in the ab-
sence of official enforcement mechanisms, the principle of voluntari-
ness, together with a range of social pressures and a strong desire for 
reconciliation, serve to enforce customary resolutions’ (ibid.).8 
 
All this could easily be taken together and mounted as a strong de-
fence of the traditional system at the expense of the formal system 
generally advocated by international organizations – but this is not 
necessarily so. Liberians – as confirmed on several occasions through 
our own fieldwork as well – generally feel that there are some cases 
which should be handled by the statutory system: 
 
                                                 
8  However, according to the USIP report, ‘Liberians also note problems with the effective-
ness and enforceability of customary institutions, mostly in areas where such institutions 
were either never meant to go, or where they have more recently been prohibited from go-
ing. Thus, as noted, customary mechanisms are generally ineffective in disputes that in-
volve parties who are not members of the community, or that pit minority members of a 
community against a majority, such as Muslims in a predominantly non-Muslim commu-
nity, or Christians in a community dominated by the Poro or other secret societies. Sev-
eral our cases involve Liberians frustrated at the lack of options available to them in pur-
suing disputes against strangers and prominent Liberians, because the formal system is 
generally ineffective, and because the elders or chiefs have no authority over the oppo-
nent.’ (Isser et al.: 48). 
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[c]ustomary mechanisms are generally considered insufficient 
to deal with certain egregious crimes, such as brutal murder 
and child rape, which most Liberians believe require the more 
severe sanctions of the formal system – despite the fact that 
they remain deeply skeptical of the effective sanctioning 
power of state institutions [...] [T]here are cases in which be-
haviour is judged to be so horrific that perpetrators are viewed 
as entirely beyond social repair, and in which Liberians often 
demand extreme forms of justice such as the death sentence. 
However, in the vast majority of situations, including many 
cases of murder and rape, social reconciliation is viewed as a 
more important objective than punishment per se. (Isser et al.: 
46–48) 
 
Such a view would also correspond to the practice of chiefs, who gen-
erally seem to refer these cases to the formal system. In a sense, then, 
the interplay between formal and traditional systems needs to take into 
account the deep-rooted perceptions, beliefs and cultural practices (for 
lack of a better term). While Liberians seem to agree that cases of rape 
should be handled by the formal system – despite its many inadequa-
cies – such a view could be adapted to local perceptions about the 
gravity of these crimes: ‘Manslaughter (involving accidental killing) 
and instances of alleged rape between young lovers in particular were 
examples of cases that respondents felt the customary system could 
resolve more effectively and for which it would produce rulings 
viewed as more fair than those afforded by the formal court system’ 
(Isser et al. 2009: 54).9 
 
Although the formal system may enjoy a fair amount of legitimacy, it 
can at times be problematic. Isser and co-workers encountered this in 
a focus group in Lofa, where men seemed somewhat suspicious of the 
new rape law and the fact that dealing with rape was now to be the 
sole prerogative of the formal system, as they feared this was open to 
abuse: ‘Some women are happy about this rape law while others are 
not. Some use this to falsely accuse their husbands probably because 
of some dispute’ (ibid.: 67). 
 
In some cases, taking matters to the formal system seems to be done 
with the intention of making money. As male elders in Nimba put it,  
 
People are using the rape thing to make money. As you know, 
we are just from war and times are hard. I recommend that we 
have such forums or show film shows in our communities, 
                                                 
9  As Isser et al. point out, ‘While chiefs often express a belief that they are as well equipped 
as—or even better equipped than – the state courts to deal with such cases, as the follow-
ing exchange demonstrates, they are aware of and are generally willing to comply with 
the policy to refer these cases to state justice authorities.’ (2009: 6). 
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towns and villages to educate our people on the importance of 
the new rape bill so that people will not misuse the opportu-
nity. Before our people just used to talk rape cases with the 
elders, but now the victim has to go to hospital for two weeks 
and all that long process. We appreciate the changes, but we 
want them to take time to do it and use more time to give 
enough education to our people. (ibid.: 67)10 
 
The wealth of material presented by Isser and her colleagues is im-
pressive, and there are many more examples that could be cited of 
cases in which traditional arrangements appear to work more effec-
tively and enjoy greater legitimacy than formal arrangements. How-
ever, it is important to note that one reason for this is the emphasis 
that traditional institutions place on restorative justice:  
 
[I]n the resolution of most types of rape most rural Liberians 
continue to emphasize restorative and socially reconciliatory 
objectives as more important than punitive ones. The objective 
of reconciliation remains particularly important in a context in 
which the kinship relations that are so vital to all aspects of 
subsistence and social order itself are likely to socially link 
perpetrators and victims and their families. (ibid. 69) 
 
We could go on mentioning examples, and the USIP report presents 
an ample amount of them which show how traditional authorities in an 
effective and seemingly legitimate manner administer justice to vic-
tims of rape. On the basis of this, there seems to be a clear argument 
here for a dual system of justice – at least in the shorter term – rather 
than for the international community to focus all its efforts on imple-
menting a weak formal system throughout the country. The research 
undertaken by USIP has shown that, just as there is no mechanism by 
which modern statutory systems ipso facto gain legitimacy by virtue 
of the principles they embody, neither are there any prescriptions for 
how such a system could become effective overnight. It would seem 
advisable to operate with caution when reforming rule-of-law institu-
tions, as failure of the new systems to operate can easily not only re-
sult in their losing support, but can also severely damage the social 
fabric. As Isser et al. ask, ‘Are strongly punitive laws, such as the rape 
law, actually changing social mores and providing a real deterrent? Or 
are they merely playing into and reinforcing the undesirable dynamics 
that currently shape how outcomes are actually negotiated in the cur-
rent ‘vacuum of justice context’ that has been created by a combina-
                                                 
10  It is important to note, as Isser et al. do, that the ‘situation that is far more complex than 
simply one in which men are accusing women of manipulating the rape law. Rather, we 
found that a significant number of Liberian men and women alike testify that the rape law 
is being manipulated by litigants of both genders to achieve other ends.’ (2009: 68). 
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tion of restrictions on the scope of authority of customary chiefs and 
the incapacity of local state justice institutions?’ (2009: 86) 
 
The case of the rape law in Liberia would indicate that a certain 
amount of duality in the international community’s efforts at address-
ing the shortcomings of so-called ‘rule-of-law institutions’ may be a 
viable road. Achieving the goals set by any international body seeking 
to address such institutions in a post-conflict setting should take into 
account the realities on the ground – rather than pursuing these goals 
and principles according to some generic blueprint at all costs.  
 
In the present case, the pursuit of the rights of women in cases of 
SGBV does not seem to have greatly improved their access to justice. 
From such a perspective, as Isser and her colleagues note, ‘in its cur-
rent form of operation and at the current pace of internal reformation, 
it would be difficult to conclude that the expansion of the formal sys-
tem’s local jurisdiction at the expense of customary alternatives is, in 
actual practice, promoting international standards of justice.’ (2009: 
86) There is little evidence that the traditional chiefs do not take the 
rights of women into account. Quite to the contrary, Isser et al. noted 
few if any complaints about how traditional authorities handle rape 
cases – whereas these exist in abundance when it comes to the formal 
court system (see ibid.: 88).11 
 
There is little to indicate that the best way to achieve justice for all – 
and especially weaker groups – in Liberia is through strengthening the 
formal system at all costs, at the expense of traditional arrangements. 
For many Liberians, justice seems to go through a dual administration 
of justice which takes due account of local practices and traditional 
arrangements. Implementing a uniform legal system, by extending one 
set of statutory law to the country as a whole with a unitary legal sys-
tem and framework that works the same way everywhere for every-
body does not stand out as the best option (see Isser et al. 2009: 71). 
For the time being – and perhaps even beyond – justice for all in Libe-
ria may involve different systems of customary and formal arrange-
ments which interplay according to principles of effectiveness, local 
legitimacy, and the extent to which they can take into account the per-
spective of the victim as well. 
Final Remarks 
The international response to the situation of women in Liberia – al-
though touted as one of the great success stories in implementing 
                                                 
11  A brief note of caution: while available evidence seems to indicate that crimes involving 
SGBV are addressed by the customary authorities in a satisfactory and effective manner, 
there is still very little research which takes into account the perspectives of the victims.  
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UNSC resolution 1325 by the UN and the Liberian government – has 
not achieved what it set out to do. Efforts at reforming the institutions 
of the rule of law have shown a mixed record, to say the least. 
 
The issue of SGBV tends to be fragmented. Responses have focused 
on specific matters which often fit the narrow agendas of international 
donors, rather than taking into account the needs of the institutions of 
the rule of law as a whole. While these quick impact-projects may be 
necessary, they tend to dominate, obstructing a holistic approach to 
reforming the rule-of-law institutions. As long as no-one in Liberia 
gets justice, women and children will not get it either – no matter how 
many police stations and courthouses are built. 
 
This does not mean that SGBV should be reduced to a legal problem 
or an issue of rule of law. A working justice system is necessary to 
address SGBV, but it may not be sufficient. Also in dealing with the 
root causes of SGBV, the UN has been stumbling in the dark. Why so 
many men in Liberia rape women and children – sometimes mere in-
fants – is a serious and difficult question. UNMIL and the UN agen-
cies in Liberia have begun to try to tackle it. However, the bureau-
cratic machinery chooses to focus on small, manageable projects 
which can show quick progress – and that approach also contributes to 
give the impression that the issues are being dealt with, when they of-
ten are not. The international response to SGBV in Liberia has fo-
cused too much on symptoms and too little on causes. 
 
Instead of looking into the country’s dual system of customary and 
statutory law, and seeing how they may work together and comple-
ment each other, international actors often act as if Liberia were a 
modern-day terra nullius – a place where nothing of what existed 
prior to the UN’s intervention can be used. Paradoxically, in those ar-
eas that do resemble such a terra nullius, like the training and compe-
tency of judges and magistrates in the statutory system, little has been 
done to address the problem through training new personnel. 
 
Dealing with SGBV in Liberia requires a comprehensive response, 
one that can take into account all the institutions of the rule of law – 
including customary justice institutions – as well as addressing the 
underlying causes rather than reactively patching up the symptoms. 
Successfully addressing SGBV requires that the policies devised and 
implemented should be based on close knowledge of the problem at 
hand and of the institutions and infrastructure available for solving 
them. A main problem today is the propensity to apply readymade, 
generic solutions that resonate well with Western donors. 
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How to manage the interplay between different systems so that most 
victims – in this case, victims of SGBV – receive acceptable justice is 
still a matter of debate. This is a question that requires urgent and sus-
tained attention. However, the fact remains that the hinterlands of Li-
beria are neither terra nullius nor a savage jungle. It is time for inter-
national rule-of-law reformers to start seeing the trees that are there, 
and discard the assumption that customary arrangements ‘out there’ 
are based on some mythical law of the jungle and can be reformed 
through indiscriminately imposing a generic Western liberal blueprint. 
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